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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
JAMES TURCSANSKI, 
Petitioner/Applicant 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
and BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
Respondent/Defendant. 
Case No, 920716-CA 
Priority No, 7 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Section 35-1-86 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues raised by this appeal are: 
a. Did Industrial Commission err when it ruled that the 
claimant had failed to meet his burden of proof with regard to the 
issue of medical causation? 
b. Did the Industrial Commission err when it affirmed 
the refusal of the Administrative Law Judge to refer the issue of 
medical causation to a medical panel? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Admin. Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-16(4)(b)&(d) 
authorize Appellate relief when an agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by statute or erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law. The standard of review with respect to questions 
of law is that the court applies a correction of error standard. 
The appellate court need give no deference to the legal 
interpretation of Section 45 applied by the Industrial Commission. 
There had been no express or implied grant of power to construe 
said statute. Cross v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm., 824 
P.2d 1202,1204 (Ut. App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Workers Compensation Case involves a Petition for Review 
of an Industrial Commission Order affirming the Administrative Law 
Judge's denial of disputed benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
a. Petitioner was employed by a self insured employer, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, on February 13, 1988. (R-00057) 
b. Claimant fell twelve (12) feet from a ladder and 
landed on his back on February 13, 1988 while cleaning the ceiling 
of a pump house. (R-00057) 
c. The Applicant was on a ladder 10 to 12 feet from the 
floor. The ladder slipped, and the Applicant fell straight down, 
but backwards. He landed on his back with the ladder beneath him. 
He put his hands down to break his fall, and he injured his arm on 
a protrusion. (R-00099) 
d. After the fall, Claimant got off the ladder and felt 
pain in his right arm and leg. He then went to the Holy Cross 
Hospital Emergency Room where he was treated for a contusion on his 
right arm and returned to work to finish his shift. (R-00099) 
e. On June 20, 1988 Applicant saw his regular treating 
physician Dr. King Udall complaining of pain in his back. Dr. 
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Udall diagnosed prostatis and prescribed medication. (R-00057) 
f. On November 20, 1989 Mr. Turcsanski again saw Dr. 
Udall complaining of neck pain among other things. Dr. Udall 
ordered a cervical x-ray. The x-ray report indicated "marked 
degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc" between C5 and C6 
and between C6 and C7. (R-00057) 
g. In December of 1991 Claimant contacted Dr. Jim 
Antinori who had originally treated him at the Holy Cross Emergency 
Room after his fall on February 13, 1988. Dr. Antinori opined that 
a back problem could have resulted from the fall and referred Mr. 
Turcsanski to Dr. Corey Anden, a physiatrist. Dr. Antinori is the 
only doctor actually familiar with the injuries suffered by 
Claimant on February 13, 1988, and made this referral only because 
the current back problem is fully consistent with those injuries. 
(R-00003) 
h. Dr. Anden saw Applicant on December 9, 1991. Dr. 
Anden indicated that Mr. Turcsanki has "persistent left-sided low 
back pain," and "he generally has increased low back pain every 
winter since 1989." Dr. Anden recommended that the applicant have 
x-rays and possibly, a CT scan. (R-00058) 
i. On December 23, 1991 Dr. Anden saw Mr. Turcsanki on 
a follow up visit and reported "post traumatic changes of the L5 
vertebral body with disk space narrowing at L4-5 most likely 
sustained in the industrial fall in 1988; possible left L3-4 
radiculopathy secondary to disk herniation; left gluteus medius 
muscular strain." (R-00004-5) 
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j. After receiving the Holy Cross Hospital emergency 
room records from the Assistant Salt Lake City attorney, Dr. Anden 
issued a letter changing her original opinion given in this case 
concluding that "In fact, it is unlikely that the lumbar vertebral 
compression fracture at L5 was sustained in the fall." 
k. There is no evidence in the record that Claimant has 
ever suffered a lumbar vertebrae compression fracture at any other 
point in his life, or that he has ever had any other accidents as 
serious as the one of February 13, 1988. (R-00044 and R-00045) 
1. There is no evidence in the record that the current 
condition of Claimant could only have resulted as an aftereffect of 
an actual lumbar vertebral compression fracture, even if it did 
result from his work related accident. (R-00044) 
m. Dr. Stuart was hired by Defendants to do a medical 
file review, and he concluded that "it is just as probable" that 
Claimant's current back and neck problems resulted from his 
accident, as from any other cause. (R-00032) 
n. The Applicant filed an Application for Hearing. (R-
00002) 
o. The Administrative Law Judge found that the injury 
to Claimant's back did not arise out of the fall on February 13, 
1988. (R-00102) 
p. The Industrial Commission affirmed the finding and 
ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. (R-00102) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission has a fundamental misconception of 
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how little additional evidence is needed to constitute a 
"preponderance" , once Defendants have conceded an equal 
probability of medical causation. 
The Industrial Commission clearly erred if any part of its 
reason for not convening a medical panel was based on its perceived 
failure by Claimant to comply with U.C.A. 35-1-99. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IN 
THIS CASE SHOW AS A MATTER OP LAW 
THAT MR. TURCSCANSKI SUFFERS FROM A 
WORK RELATED BACK INJURY 
Claimant acknowledges that he has the burden of proving 
medical causation between his back problem, and his work related 
accident of February 13, 1988. Further, he is required to prove 
this causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Large v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988). 
The dispute in this case, then, is over how the Industrial 
Commission understands and applies the legal standard of 
"preponderance of the evidence". Preponderance of the evidence 
clearly only means more probable than not, or, roughly, 51% of the 
"weight" of the evidence. The Industrial commission, on the other 
hand, has used a standard in the instant case which has required 
the Claimant to prove that it was much more likely than not that 
his present condition resulted from his accident. 
For the purpose of this case, and consistent with the findings 
of its own doctor, (R-00043-44) the City has already conceded that 
it is equally probable that the claim of Mr. Turcsanski, is valid. 
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"[T]he medical evidence demonstrated that it was [only] equally 
probable that a non-industrial exertion caused the Applicant's 
condition." (R-00080) (And note the use there of the "proximate 
cause" language disapproved by this Court in Large.) Thus, it is 
clear that only very little more evidence of causation was required 
to be presented by claimant, before his burden of proof had been 
fully met. However, it is also clear from the decision of the 
Industrial Commission that it simply did not understand this very 
fundamental proposition. 
Please note the following two facts: (1) Dr. Antinori, the 
only physician actually familiar with the original injuries of 
Claimant, thought it likely enough for the back problem to have 
resulted from the accident that he made a referral for further 
review (R-00003); and (2) at one time or another, Dr. Anden has 
stated both that "It is probable that the lumbar injury seen on the 
x-rays was sustained in the fall" (R-00004), and that "the lumbar 
disc space narrowing at the L4-5 level . . . may be related to 
trauma". Both of these facts were completely discounted by the 
Industrial Commission, in spite of the fact that this case was a 
draw without them. In reality, however, these facts cannot be made 
to disappear from the record, and they need be given no more than 
almost no weight at all before they tip an evenly balanced scale in 
the favor of Claimant. 
The totality of the record in this case leaves no doubt that 
the accident of February 13, 1988 could have caused the condition 
that Claimant now suffers from. The denial of his claim by the 
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Industrial Commission, on the other hand, resulted only from the 
possibility that Claimant might be suffering solely from a 
degenerative condition. However, the fact is undisputed that, if 
Claimant does not have a degenerative condition, there is no other 
source of trauma that he has ever suffered that can account for his 
present problem. Further, trauma caused aggravation of pre 
existing conditions is at least partially compensable, and is a 
widely noted fact in back problem cases. (See e.g. Large, and 
Kennecott Corp. v. Indus. Com'm of Utah, 740 P.3d 305 (Utah App. 
1987). So, it should be held, as a matter of law, that any 
accident sufficient in itself to have caused a back injury, would, 
at the very least, have acted to aggravate a pre-existing 
condition, if any there was, which the Claimant might have suffered 
from. Further, if this claimant had no pre-existing degenerative 
condition, then the only other possible cause of his current 
condition is the trauma of February 13, 1988. 
The Industrial commission has required this Claimant to show 
that it was highly likely that his back problem resulted from his 
accident. Even under this standard, Mr. Turcsanski should have 
prevailed, because a fall like his, at a minimum, would have had 
some lasting impact on a back that was already less than perfect. 
However, Claimant was only required to show that medical causation 
was more likely than not, the result of his work related accident 
and the concession of Defendant almost removed even this relatively 
low barrier. Accordingly, only very little additional evidence was 
required before Claimant could prevail, and the Industrial 
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Commission must be reversed for its faulty understanding of the law 
in this area. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 
COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THIS CASE TO 
GO FORWARD TO A MEDICAL PANEL FOR DECIDING THE 
ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION 
It is not clear what role the interpretation of U.C.A. 35-1-99 
by the Industrial Commission played in the outcome of this matter. 
However, there is no doubt that the law holds this to have been a 
case appropriate for the appointment of a U.C.A. 35-1-77 "Medical 
Panel". 
Workers are all people who can have accidents on the job, but 
almost none of them are doctors. Thus, the "accident and injury" 
phrase of Section 35-1-99 can only mean "don't take any more than 
a year to tell your employer that you've had an accident that hurt 
you". The interpretation of this language advocated by Defendants 
would, of course, mean only those persons who can tell what is 
wrong with themselves can ever recover under a Workers Compensation 
Claim. Clearly, the Legislature never intended that compensation 
would be avoidable in all but such a narrow class of cases. 
"The purpose of the notice requirement is two-fold: (1) to 
enable the employer to provide immediate medical diagnosis and 
treatment; and (2) to facilitate the earliest possible 
investigation of the facts surrounding the injury." Kennecott, at 
P.309 (emphasis added). The first purpose is clearly for the 
benefit of the employee. There would be no logic in concluding 
that employers are saved from paying for those injuries that their 
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own doctors fail to discover. A more counterproductive result 
could hardly be imagined. The second purpose is fully served when 
the employer knows enough to be able to study and document the 
accidents that their employees claim to have been the victims of. 
Obviously, then, this second purpose is simply not implicated in 
the instant case, because there is no doubt that the present back 
problems of Mr. Turcsanski are fully consistent with the earlier 
accident that he suffered, and that that accident was reported 
immediately. 
Further, back injuries are an inherently complicated area of 
medicine. (Recovery, is available for an injury that aggravates a 
"pre-existing condition", Large at P.955. A 1984 back surgery 
"was necessitated by residuals from the 1969 neck injury". 
Kennecott at P.307). This, then is exactly the sort of case where 
the uncertainties undoubtedly would have benefited from review and 
considerations by independent medical experts. 
CONCLUSION 
The totality of the record in this matter shows that it is 
more likely than not that the Claimant suffers from back problems 
that were caused, or at least aggravated by the February 13, 1988 
accident on the job. At a minimum, then, a medical panel should 
review what portion of his current problems resulted from that 
accident. 
DATED this ')o day of April, 1993. 
ROBERT BREEZE x-
Attomey for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to: 
Benjamin Simms 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Frank Nakamura 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
451 South State, Suite 505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jim Turcsanski 
4008 Stillwater Way 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
on this 1993. 
^MJA--. 
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